

Joshua DiPaolo | CV

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Employment

Kansas State University Visiting Assistant Professor

Fall 2016-Present

Education

University of Massachusetts, Amherst PhD Philosophy 2016

University of Wisconsin, Madison MA Philosophy 2010

California State University, Northridge (CSUN) BA Philosophy, Minor Linguistics 2008
Magna Cum Laude, With Honors

Areas of Interest

AOS: Epistemology, Ethics, Metaethics

AOC: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics

Additional Teaching Interest: Philosophy of Race

Publications

1. The Word of a Reluctant Convert
Forthcoming in *Synthese*
2. Second-Best Epistemology: Fallibility and Normativity
Forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*
3. Evidence and Fallibility
Forthcoming in *Episteme*
4. Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99(2) (2018): 248 – 269
5. Indoctrination Anxiety and the Etiology of Belief (with Robert M. Simpson)
Synthese 193 (2016): 3078 – 3098.
6. Probabilistic Promotion Revisited (with Jeff Behrends)
Philosophical Studies 173(7) (2016): 1735 – 1754.
7. Reason to Promotion Inferences (with Jeff Behrends)
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, August (2015): 1 – 10.
8. Finlay and Schroeder on Promoting a Desire (with Jeff Behrends)
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, December (2011): 1 – 7.

Work in Progress

Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness (R&R at *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*)

Disagreeing with Converts (In Preparation)

Epistemic Self-Licensing (In Preparation)

No Vice in Sight? (In Preparation)

Public Writing

The Origin of Belief (with Robert Simpson) [Invited]

The Forum: Thinking in Public. (2016) <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/theforum/the-origin-of-belief/>

Reprinted in *The Philosopher's Magazine* 78(3) (2017): 90 – 93.

Dissertation

Title: *Fallibility and Epistemic Normativity*

Committee: Hilary Kornblith (Chair), Christopher Meacham, Katia Vavova
Erik Cheries (Psychology)

Description: Sometimes we should abandon our rationally formed beliefs when we acquire misleading evidence suggesting we arrived at those beliefs in error. In other words, sometimes we should give up our beliefs even when we're believing exactly what we should be believing. Why? Not for standard Evidentialist or Bayesian reasons. Rather, to cope with our imperfection. Imperfect reasoners aware of their flaws must reason in imperfect ways. In my dissertation, I substantiate these claims by examining fallibility, defeat, epistemic reasons, and non-ideal theory in ethics and epistemology.

Presentations

Behind the Veil: Teaching Rawls through Digital Gaming (w/ Scott Tanona)
Eastern APA. Innovative Methods in Philosophical Pedagogy. January 2018.

Conversion, Epistemic Virtue, and Self-Licensing
Central States Philosophical Association Conference. October 2017.

Reason to Promotion Inferences (w/ Jeff Behrends)
Central States Philosophical Association Conference. November 2015.

Probabilistic Promotion Revisited (w/ Jeff Behrends)
Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference. August 2015.

Higher-Order Defeat
California State University, Northridge. February 2015.

Epistemic Akrasia and Evidence
Northern New England Philosophical Association Conference. August 2013

In Defense of Modal Invariantism
Syracuse Philosophy Graduate Conference. April 2012

When do the Means Promote the Ends? (w/ Jeff Behrends)
Naturalisms in Ethics, Auckland, NZ. July 2011

Time Travel and Mereology: Simple Self-Visitation
Iowa Philosophical Society Conference. November 2009

Comments

On S. Arkonovich and A. Salomon's "Moral Testimony and Anti-Luck Epistemology"

Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference. August 2015.
On B. Fischer's "TRUE is False"
Central States Philosophical Association Conference. September 2012

Presentations for Students

Healthcare Ethics: Tips for Interviews
Pre-Physician Assistant Meeting, K-State. September 2018. Invited by former student.
Going from Cal State System to Graduate School in Philosophy
California State University, Northridge. February 2015. Invited.
Killing the Frog: On the Philosophy of Humor
Faculty Chat, UMass Amherst. April 2014. Invited by former student.

Awards, Honors, & Fellowships

Peer Review of Teaching Program Teaching Portfolio (65 pages) recognized as an "Exemplar."
Peer Review Teaching Fellowship Kansas State University, Teaching & Learning Center 2017-2018
Dissertation Summer Stipend UMass, Amherst 2015
Dissertation Fellowship Saint Louis University, Templeton Intellectual Humility Project 2014-2015
Dissertation Fellowship Northwestern University, Social Epistemology 2014-2015 [Declined]
Robison Prize For teaching excellence. UMass, Amherst, Philosophy Dept., 2013-2014
Oliver Prize For best graduate student paper. UW, Madison, Philosophy Dept., 2008-2009
Luckenbach Award For work in logic/philosophy of science. CSUN, Philosophy Dept., 2007-2008
Presidential Scholarship For work on context-sensitivity in language. CSUN, 2007-2008

Teaching Experience

Kansas State University

Philosophy of Religion: Conversion and Radicalization (Seminar)
Epistemology (Majors Course)
Philosophy and Race
Medical Ethics (x4)
Introduction to Moral Philosophy (x7)
Introduction to Philosophical Problems (x6)

UMass: Instructor: Full Responsibility

Philosophy of Humor
Traditional and Social Epistemology
Medical Ethics
Introduction to Ethics Online (x3)
Introduction to Philosophy Online (x2)
Medical Ethics Online
Introduction to Logic Online

UMass or UW Madison: Teaching Assistant

Critical Thinking
Symbolic Logic (x2)
Introduction to Ethics (x3)

Introduction to Philosophy (x3)

Service

Refereeing: *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (2016, 2018); *Dialectica* (2015, 2017); *Episteme* (2018 x2); *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* (2016, x2); *Philosophical Studies* (2016, 2017 x2); *Res Philosophica* (2018); *Synthese* (2018)

Graduate Coursework

(* Signifies audit.)

Epistemology

Bootstrapping, Closure, and Disagreement (Titelbaum)
Bayesianism (Meacham)
Modal Epistemology (Eddon & Levine)
Intuitions (Kornblith)
Epistemic Normativity (Kornblith)
Naturalism & the First Person Perspective (Kornblith & Baker)
Epistemic Justification* (Kornblith)
Inductive Reasoning* (Titelbaum)

Language & Logic

Philosophy of Language (Antony)
Philosophy of Language (Sidelle)
Modal Logic (Hardegree)

Metaphysics

Time Travel (Vranas)
Material Objects (Sidelle)
Objects and Metametaphysics (Sidelle)
Metametaphysics (Eddon)
Identity & Modality* (Sidelle)

Ethics & Metaethics

Ross and Intuitionism (Graham)
Moral Responsibility (Sartorio)
Normativity (Shafer-Landau)
Puzzles in Decision Theory (Meacham)

History

Spinoza (Nadler)
Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind (Gottlieb)
Ancient Philosophy* (Gottlieb)

General References

Hilary Kornblith University of Massachusetts Amherst	kornblith@philos.umass.edu
Christopher Meacham University of Massachusetts Amherst	cmeacham@philos.umass.edu
Robert Simpson University College, London	robert.simpson@ucl.ac.uk
Michael Titelbaum University of Wisconsin, Madison	titlebaum@gmail.com
Katia Vavova Mount Holyoke College	evavova@mt.holyoke.edu

Teaching References

Bruce Glymour Kansas State University	glymour@k-state.edu
Peter Graham University of Massachusetts, Amherst	pgraham@philos.umass.edu